AnalysisDayton

Tadić: Political indecency and the right not to become victims of our own political choices

Tadić: Political indecency and the right not to become victims of our own political choices

Lawyer Ognjen Tadić has criticized calls to replace the Dayton constitutional framework of BiH, arguing that proposals to abolish protections for constituent peoples risk undermining the political equality of Serbs and Croats. In an opinion article, he warned that constitutional reform cannot be presented as progress if it leaves communities dependent on the goodwill of a numerical majority.

Tadić’s commentary followed an interview on Sarajevo-based Face TV in which journalist Senad Hadžifejzović questioned Russian Ambassador Igor Kalabukhov about the Dayton Peace Agreement and the possibility of adopting a new constitution for BiH.

During the interview, Hadžifejzović questioned whether Dayton was responsible for the country’s political difficulties and why so much effort was devoted to preserving the agreement rather than replacing it.

Tadić interpreted the questions as an attempt to secure international support for fundamental changes to BiH’s constitutional structure.

The limits of political decency

There was something in that conversation that went beyond an ordinary television debate. It was not merely a disagreement about the Dayton Peace Agreement or its possible reform, but an attempt to present to a foreign representative, as a generally acceptable political objective, something that would require the constituent peoples to relinquish institutional guarantees of their equality.

The consequence, in Tadić’s assessment, would be a system in which one constituent people, the Bosniaks, could gain political dominance over the other two, Serbs and Croats.

He considers it particularly inappropriate that such demands are presented in the name of civic normality, European integration and political modernization.

Simply describing a political proposal as civic, he argues, does not automatically make it neutral, universal or free from the interests of particular political communities.

How appropriate is it to persuade a people that their interests are best served by something they recognize as surrendering their own political security? Why should Serbs and Croats believe that abolishing protective mechanisms would give them greater influence over the future of their communities?

According to Tadić, these questions expose the difference between the declared objectives of constitutional reform and its possible consequences.

He argues that it is difficult to advocate equality for all citizens while simultaneously insisting on a model that could deprive certain communities of mechanisms protecting their collective political position.

For Serbs and Croats, he writes, abolishing constitutional guarantees would not necessarily represent an expansion of civic rights. Instead, it could create a situation in which they become permanent political minorities whose position depends on the interests and goodwill of the majority.

A right dependent on another party’s goodwill, Tadić maintains, can hardly be regarded as a right in the full constitutional sense. It becomes permission that exists only as long as those granting it remain willing to respect it.

Collective rights as a guarantee of mutual security

The constitutional status of constituent peoples and mechanisms protecting collective rights are not merely historical remnants of an outdated political system, Tadić argues.

Rather, they represent an institutional response to the fact that BiH is not a nationally homogeneous state and that its stability cannot rest on the assumption that the will of the current majority necessarily represents the will of all citizens and peoples.

In his interpretation, the purpose of BiH’s constitutional framework is not to grant privileges to any particular community but to prevent the numerical superiority of one people, acting independently or in alliance with another, from becoming a source of permanent political domination.

Collective rights, he explains, are intended to provide lasting protection regardless of changing demographic or political circumstances.

The population structure of BiH has changed significantly since the war, and there is no guarantee that today’s demographic balance will remain unchanged over the next ten or twenty years.

Tadić therefore poses a hypothetical question: What would happen if Serbs and Croats together became a two-thirds majority, or another dominant majority, in BiH?

Would it then be acceptable for them to invoke Christian identity, historical grievances or other arguments to justify political dominance while Bosniaks, most of whom are Muslim, were left without institutional guarantees protecting their status as a constituent people?

He emphasizes that this is neither a prediction nor a desired demographic outcome, but a test of the consistency of the political principle being advocated.

Collective rights, he argues, must remain a principle of equality rather than a temporary instrument for distributing political power.

Their legitimacy should not depend on which community happens to have more inhabitants or political representatives at a particular moment.

Constituent peoples understand one another’s historical experiences

Tadić notes that mistrust among the peoples of BiH is not exclusively a consequence of contemporary political disputes.

It also has historical roots.

Serbs and Croats, he writes, have experienced political systems in which others determined their constitutional and political position.

Consequently, proposals that would make their constitutional guarantees dependent on the will of a majority to which they do not belong are viewed with particular concern.

Such proposals, according to Tadić, raise fears of returning to a political arrangement in which one community defines the nature of the state while others must continually demonstrate that they deserve equality.

In deeply divided societies, he argues, constitutional systems must acknowledge the historical and political reasons why communities may not trust that their rights will be protected without institutional guarantees.

The Dayton constitutional order did not emerge from an arbitrary political experiment.

It resulted from the need to establish a balance among political communities, constituent peoples and the present-day entities, none of which were prepared to surrender control over their political future to others.

Tadić maintains that this underlying reality has not fundamentally changed.

Equality is not hostility toward BiH

Serbs and Croats are under no obligation to abandon their constitutional protections to demonstrate loyalty to BiH, Tadić argues.

Their demand for political equality is not inherently incompatible with the country’s existence.

On the contrary, he considers equality a necessary condition for BiH to function as a shared political community rather than a state in which one community determines the political destiny of others.

He applies the same principle to Bosniaks.

Just as Serbs and Croats should not be required to relinquish their collective rights, Bosniaks should not be expected to abandon their national identity or constitutional protections to demonstrate their commitment to BiH.

However, Tadić argues that all three constituent peoples must recognize BiH as a common state whose constitutional structure cannot be based on the assumption that any temporary numerical majority has the exclusive authority to define the limits of political equality.

Demanding that others surrender constitutional guarantees is not proof of loyalty to the state, he writes, just as preserving those guarantees is not evidence of hostility toward BiH.

The right not to become one’s own political victim

Tadić concludes that the insistence of Serbs and Croats on preserving constitutional mechanisms of equality should not automatically be characterized as extreme or anti-state nationalism.

Instead, he describes it as a matter of political dignity and the basic logic of equality among constituent peoples.

In his view, political representatives in Sarajevo should not respond to these concerns by suggesting that Serbs and Croats must accept the removal of their own constitutional protections as a prerequisite for a better political future.

He considers such demands particularly inappropriate when they are presented publicly in the presence of foreign diplomatic representatives.

The central message of Tadić’s commentary is that constitutional reform must respect the political security and equality of all constituent peoples, rather than requiring any community to become the victim of its own political concessions.

Source: RTRS

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