The European Union and India announced on 27 January 2026 that an agreement on a free trade deal had been reached—described by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen as “the mother of all deals.” Despite the initial euphoria in Brussels, it is important to note that negotiations began back in 2007 and were repeatedly suspended, indicating that the agreement’s real reach will only be clear through implementation.
It is evident that for Brussels this is not merely about trade, but also an attempt to politically affirm its proclaimed strategic autonomy. The timing is no coincidence, coming amid heightened transatlantic tensions, including the recent escalation over Greenland. This is where Europe’s collision with the United States 🇺🇸 becomes apparent, since emphasizing European independence inevitably undermines the postwar model in which America has been the key pillar of European security and stability. Framing the agreement as a major triumph can easily be read in Washington as a political message—if not a provocation.
“This is not just a trade agreement, but a political signal of Europe’s attempt to assert strategic autonomy at a moment of rising transatlantic tensions.”
Signs already suggest that an American response will follow. US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent publicly expressed disappointment and linked the European move to broader political issues, including Ukraine and energy. This signals that Washington may move beyond rhetoric, using tariffs, trade leverage, and conditionality in technology and defense—consistent with US strategic doctrine that expects allies to align with American security priorities.
The agreement still requires legal harmonization and ratification, leaving room for US political influence to materialize through individual EU member states more sensitive to American pressure. At the same time, India is not immune to pressure either, particularly where access to US defense technologies and industrial cooperation is strategically important.
Taken together, this could mean delays, additional conditions, or even blockage, despite the agreement’s headline announcement. Parallel to this, the EU has recently advanced cooperation with Mercosur, signaling an attempt to deepen ties with major economies beyond the transatlantic framework. Brazil, as Mercosur’s largest economy, is its central pillar. Both Brazil and India are founding members of BRICS, further complicating transatlantic relations, especially regarding standards, technology, and political positioning.
India continues to pursue a policy of multi-alignment and is clearly not entering this agreement as an instrument of someone else’s geopolitics. As a key BRICS state, India’s evolving relations with the EU—and the dynamics within BRICS—may shape the pace, content, and strategic weight of the agreement’s implementation.
For Republika Srpska and the wider region, the implications extend beyond economics. If the EU enters a phase of intensified transatlantic friction and trade becomes a tool of political and security conditionality, the key question will be whether the Union can absorb and manage such pressures amid internal challenges and divergent member-state interests. Failure to do so risks weakening cohesion and increasing instability, with negative consequences for our political and security environment.
“Lower political predictability within the EU and a wider space for conditionality increase the risk of sudden shifts in agendas and priorities.”
It is therefore essential to monitor the ratification process, positions of key EU member states, signals related to NATO obligations and defense arrangements, forthcoming US moves, and developments within BRICS. Under current conditions, political predictability in the EU is lower, while leverage through conditionality is greater—directly affecting our surroundings and stability projections in the period ahead.
Source: CDPI
