How did Milorad Dodik play the final note of the protectorate’s dictatorship and the Bosniak political elite in Republika Srpska?
Many claim that Bosnia and Herzegovina is in its deepest crisis since the end of the war, but it would be more accurate to say that the Bosnian knot is in the process of unraveling. The final months of last year and the first months of this year may prove to be historically pivotal for the fate of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Milorad Dodik, with his presidential signature on the decision of the National Assembly of Republika Srpska (NSRS), which was published in the Official Gazette, has returned Republika Srpska to the original Dayton Agreement, specifically Annex 4. From now on, only what aligns with the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina will be valid within its territory. With this move, he has played the final note of the protectorate’s dictatorship and the dominance of the Bosniak political elite in Republika Srpska. The Peace Implementation Council (PIC), with a restrained statement, distanced itself from Christian Schmidt. EUFOR issued a statement affirming that it would maintain order and peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, a message aimed at the enraged Bosniaks, whose police units demonstratively conducted exercises near the entity borders.
Then, like a bolt from the blue, Donald Trump’s State Department chief, Marco Rubio, spoke out.
He called for everything in Bosnia to be reset to the beginning, backed the Office of the High Representative (OHR), reinforced the Bonn powers, and rebuked Dodik. In response to a Bosniak appeal, the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina accused Dodik of attempting a coup. While this court is a category established by the Dayton Agreement, it cannot legally function without Serbian representatives, who have withdrawn. Meanwhile, in a phone conversation with Aleksandar Vučić, Vladimir Putin stated, “We will do everything for Republika Srpska,” expressing solidarity with Dodik. In response, Vučić invited Dodik to address the Serbian National Assembly.
THREE DECADES OF AWAITED FIVE MINUTES
Dodik had long announced this move, demanding the return of entity competencies that had been taken away, the abolition of imposed laws and unconstitutional institutions. The protectorate, on the other hand, responded with “new necessary reforms,” “the spirit of Dayton,” “cheaper and more efficient systemic solutions,” seizing entity competencies, imposing laws and institutions, and applying pressure and blackmail through new tools such as the High Representative’s Bonn powers, the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina (where foreign judges have a decisive role), and the fabricated Prosecutor’s Office and Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Dodik would tactically retreat halfway through procedures, but he kept well-developed legal and sub-legal documents, already adopted by the government and the National Assembly, stored away in his drawer. Because of this, he was criticized by the opposition for never seeing things through to the end. At the same time, he lulled both foreigners and Bosnians into thinking, “Dodik is just bluffing again!”
A new dynamic in this chronic antagonistic coexistence emerged with Russia’s return to the Balkans, particularly with the success of the Special Military Operation in Ukraine, followed by Donald Trump’s return to the helm of the United States, bringing back his old plan to radically shift American foreign policy.
“I will immediately make peace with Putin,” was a spectacular statement that delighted a world teetering on the brink of World War III. Vučić, adhering to the policy of military neutrality—which Dodik soon joined—repeated, more often than Dodik, Serbia’s European aspirations. Meanwhile, Dodik, more than Vučić, insisted on friendship with Russia. And so they waited for Putin and Trump to collaborate again, to resume exchanging ambassadors, and for the Special Military Operation to no longer be called an “aggression against Ukraine.” Consequently, perhaps Serbs were no longer the ‘malignant little Russians.’ Dodik, Putin’s friend and Trump’s electoral supporter, finally reached his long-awaited five minutes after three decades.
CLIMAX OF THE BOSNIAN TRAGICOMEDY
However, in Sarajevo, during the interlude between the victory of the old/new president and his move into the White House, Biden’s ambassador remained in place, assisted by the phantom high representative Christian Schmidt, both determined to politically remove the President of Republika Srpska, who had made their mandates in Bosnia and Herzegovina unbearable. A race against time began: would they manage to remove him from office with the help of the fabricated Prosecutor’s Office and Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, or would he succeed in expelling them prematurely from Bosnia? Ambassador Murphy had to return home without even a farewell before Dodik was convicted in the first instance, while Schmidt hid in a hole, waiting for the commotion to pass. His arrival at the Office of the High Representative is likely the climax of the Bosnian tragicomedy. Paradoxically, one could say that he, even more than Putin and Trump, with his reckless and disproportionate moves (rivers, forests, fields, prosecuting the President of Republika Srpska), added the final drop that overflowed the cup.
In this impossible state, “where all logic ceases at its borders,” anything is possible, even the Schmidt phenomenon. This foreign governor did not become Bosnia’s ruler “by divine will, inheritance, democratic election, or even administrative appointment,” but rather appointed himself to govern a country in which one nation wants to live with its executioners, another nation is not allowed to celebrate its birthday, the third nation has its representative elected by the first, three nations have been unable to agree on anything for thirty years, they have an anthem without lyrics that is sung, a flag with fleur-de-lis in EU colors, which has no symbolic connection either to Bosnia and Herzegovina or to any of its three nations.
SEVEN HIGH REPRESENTATIVES
Seven high representatives have, over the course of 30 years, unlawfully and unconstitutionally altered the fundamental documents on which post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina rests, despite the signatures of the three local national parties and the guarantees of major powers. From the very beginning of the implementation of the annexes, the competencies of the high representatives were arbitrarily redefined, and they were armed with practically unlimited Bonn powers. The cynical Paddy Ashdown abused them the most, but none of the others missed the opportunity to add something as well. However, almost none of these changes were completed through amendments to the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as such changes required long and complicated procedures and faced local resistance—an inconvenience the arrogant high representatives were unwilling to deal with. This is why Dodik is now able to refer to the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The goal of the collective West was the “reintegration of Bosnia and Herzegovina,” which practically meant a Westminster-style democracy, one man – one vote, the legitimate dominance of the most numerous ethnic group, and Bosnia and Herzegovina as a state of the Bosniak people with two minorities. Speaking of “reintegration” was inappropriate from the outset since Bosnia and Herzegovina had never been integrated in the first place. On the contrary, its history was one of religious and national conflicts, with shorter or longer pauses, which were alternately ignited and extinguished by either foreign occupiers or domestic political manipulators, a process that simply continued in post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina.
BOSNIAN KETMAN
The first free elections at the transition between communism and post-communism showed that the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina were merely simulating a politically desirable sense of unity and coexistence: in all surveys, respondents claimed they would vote for reformists and communists, yet the three national parties won 80 percent of the votes. Bosnian Ketman! But other nations were no better. A year before the breakup of the SFRY, an overwhelming majority of Slovenes and Croats supported a reformed common state, only to then vote unanimously for secession. The Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was, therefore, merely a miniature version of the SFRY.
The content of the Dayton Agreement, along with its annexes, signed by the three parties and backed by international guarantees, reflected the real situation and relationships, distributing satisfaction and dissatisfaction among the three nations: “Bosnia, whole and in three parts.”
However, the following decades brought a creeping, systematic dismantling of the Dayton Agreement, brick by brick. The international protectorate in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in many ways, took inspiration from the communist-era Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Quite simply, that system functioned, however imperfectly, for 45 years, so the idea was to replicate it under new historical circumstances. Just like before, all democratic institutions exist—parliament, executive power, an independent judiciary—but above them all stands an almighty political bureau of the Communist Party led by a general secretary, who today takes the form of the Peace Implementation Council and the high representative armed with dictatorial Bonn powers, in coordination with foreign judges.
ASSESSING THE MOMENTUM
Just as Kardelj, in his time, would introduce constitutional amendments or draft new constitutions whenever his rich constitutional imagination stumbled upon the existing one, the protectors have not lagged behind in producing new systemic solutions. Meanwhile, since Tito famously stated that “laws should not be followed like a drunk clings to a fence,” and since the “comrades from Bosnia” were his most loyal disciples, what was illegal and unconstitutional was still considered legitimate. That is why Bosnia was called the “dark vilayet.” The protectorate simply continued this dark vilayet policy in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but this generation of Serbian politicians, led by Dodik, decided to resist. To what extent this resistance is owed to Dodik’s leadership skills, Putin’s support, Trump’s shift in policy, or Schmidt’s provocations is a topic for separate analysis. What is certain is that the President of Republika Srpska assessed the momentum correctly when these historical forces converged and made a bold, and likely the only possible, move. Do the words of the U.S. Secretary of State suggest that he made a catastrophic miscalculation, both for Republika Srpska and for his own political fate? No, absolutely not! Even during the Clinton era, when the world’s only superpower was at the height of its dominance, Republika Srpska emerged in defiance of the collective West, while others had no say. Today, Republika Srpska enjoys the support of two superpowers, Russia and China, two EU and NATO members, Hungary and Slovakia, and even, at the presidential level, Croatia. Zoran Milanović warns: “Tomorrow, this could happen to us as well.”
RUBIO SHOULD KNOW
However, first and foremost, it is necessary to wait and see what Marco Rubio’s statement actually means, as it conspicuously deviates from Trump’s strategic policies of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries, leaving Europe to the Europeans. This statement comes from the new head of the State Department, who has been tasked by the president with first cleaning out the Democratic leftovers from the Clinton-Obama-Biden continuity (Albright, Hillary, O’Brien)—the same deputy assistant secretaries who made Trump’s first term and all of Dodik’s mandates difficult. At the same time, Rubio should be well aware that Trump’s partners in extinguishing the fire in Ukraine—Putin and his favorite European leader, Orbán—openly and strongly support Dodik. If we do not soon hear some sort of denial, clarification, or softening from Rubio himself, this could suggest a correction—or even a policy reversal—in U.S. foreign strategy, as Trump has already moved in multiple directions. Is a counterattack against Trump taking place within the State Department? The recent urgent and extraordinary session of the UN Security Council, requested by Russia, did not yield the expected outcome, as the U.S. ambassador to the UN remains unchanged. Whatever the case may be, Dodik responded promptly and with confidence: “Even if Rubio were God Almighty himself, there will be no retreat…”
LONDON RETURNS TO THE GAME
Sources from Banja Luka claim that London has taken over crisis management in Bosnia and Herzegovina from Washington and Berlin. After the now-forgotten Brexit, Britain is informally returning to the EU by sabotaging Trump’s agreement with Putin over Ukraine, following the course set by Boris Johnson. Is this an attempt to prevent German or French leadership in the renewed unity of the old EU, excluding Orbán and Fico? Or is it about monopolizing privileged communication with the United States? Or is it the endemic Russophobia of the British? Or perhaps Churchill’s notion that Britain is simultaneously a member of the European Community, the Commonwealth, and the Anglo-American alliance, and that the empire should not abandon any of those ties? All assessments indicate that this armed solidarity with Zelensky, without U.S. support, lacks the necessary capacity in terms of weapons and money, regardless of a unified will. However, perhaps a demonstration of unity and efficiency in the Balkans, specifically in Bosnia and Herzegovina, could be welcomed. Britain, France, and Germany, despite internal social, economic, and political tensions, each have the capacity to undertake such an initiative individually. But striking a match in the middle of the Balkan powder keg is unlikely to benefit anyone at this moment.
SOMETHING FOR EVERYONE
Indeed, Rubio’s statement contains something for everyone: reassurance for panicked Bosniaks that the U.S. has not forgotten them, a move to preserve the headless OHR, but also an introductory message that “the peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina should come to an agreement”—which is precisely what Republika Srpska is proposing: either a return to the original Dayton Agreement, a new agreement, or a negotiated separation. Finally, the ever-unpredictable neo-Ottomanist Erdogan could come to the aid of his Bosnian Muslim brothers, but he has entered Syria, escalated tensions to the breaking point with Netanyahu—and thus directly with Trump—so opening new fronts is not in his interest.
It is difficult to offer any reliable prediction because the era of post-truth, post-facts, and post-common sense has become the prevailing diagnosis of the postmodern world, marking the decline of global neoliberal hegemony. If this retreating pandemic can still be clearly observed anywhere, it is in Bosnia and Herzegovina. No satellite images are needed; following the local daily news is enough to immediately grasp the situation, which is commonly referred to there as “the madman screwing with the confused.” In this controlled chaos, maintained for three decades, Christian Schmidt has found himself without diplomatic experience, without political acumen, with a poor understanding of Bosnia’s history and the mentality of its peoples, and with only average intelligence. Benjamin Kállay, who had all these qualities in abundance, failed in his efforts—but unlike Schmidt, he did not lose self-control, shout from the podium, slam his fist on the desk, or recklessly push himself further into trouble.
EXCESSIVE PERSISTENCE – LACK OF SHAME
Let’s be clear—the so-called “international” protectorate in Bosnia and Herzegovina adhered to the Constitution and laws only to the extent that they did not interfere with the plundering of Republika Srpska. Otherwise, it seized competencies, imposed laws, established institutions, and dismissed officials. Schmidt’s problem is that, frustrated by his unquestionably questionable status, which Dodik kept reminding him of, he completely lost all restraint. He imposed changes to the Criminal Code just to use a fabricated court to get Dodik out of the way. In a scandalous move without precedent in modern history, he amended the Election Law to facilitate the formation of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s government, only to reverse it 24 hours later, ultimately harming the Bosniaks. Instead of correcting the law that allows Bosniaks to elect the Croatian member of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, a blatant injustice towards Bosnian Croats, he made himself the target of sarcastic remarks from Croatia’s witty president, Zoran Milanović. Excessive persistence and lack of shame—Schmidt, who politically holds no real status, decided to resolve everything at once. He attacked the highest authority and the largest property of Republika Srpska, which would effectively abolish it de facto.
Unlike Zelensky, who was thrown out of the White House when he tried to say that it was not he, but the Americans who provoked Russia’s special military operation in Ukraine by moving missile launchers toward its borders, Izetbegović, after being presented with constitutional principles of a confederation and a quarter of the territory in Geneva, returned to Sarajevo to tell his people that “he hadn’t lost anything that was defended in the war.”
KARADŽIĆ FELL FOR A PROMISE AND WAS HUNTED LIKE A BEAST
Finally, there could also be a backroom, indecent offer to Dodik—to freeze his historic presidential signature on the National Assembly of Republika Srpska’s decision to defend the Dayton Constitution in exchange for an acquittal at the Court of Appeals. But even if he were inclined to accept such a deal, he has the experience of Republika Srpska’s founder. Radovan Karadžić fell for Holbrooke’s promise that the Hague Tribunal would not prosecute him if he resigned, only to be hunted down like a beast for years. In short, this is a group that cannot be trusted at their word. Republika Srpska has made its position clear, and now it is up to them to find a solution that will not lead to even worse consequences. Henry Kissinger once said: “We can win in Bosnia, but it will solve nothing.”
Maybe, in all this chaos, it is time to return to fundamental questions. Why is the existence of Bosnia and Herzegovina, according to the “international community”—read: the united West—considered inevitable, unquestionable, and sacrosanct?
For Bosniaks, this position is understandable. They have territorial ambitions toward Republika Srpska, calling it a temporarily occupied territory and a genocidal creation. But why does the now divided West, at least its European part, insist on a unitary Bosnia at all costs, without any explanation? Even though all the great powers signed to guarantee Dayton, they have long been searching for ways to dismantle it— through Dayton Plus, Dayton 2, the “Spirit of Dayton,” constitutional reforms, transitioning from Dayton to Brussels, and so on.
“NEW YALTA” WILL BEGIN WITH THE ORIGINAL DAYTON
Some Bosniak commentators claim that Bosnia and Herzegovina is a “geopolitical necessity,” but they fail to explain why. The underlying assumptions include the Vatican-Vienna strategy of advancing eastward toward Russia’s borders, the Germanic push southward to the warm Mediterranean shores, the Western frontier on the Drina, Kállay’s policy of creating a Bosnian nation with Bogomil roots, the division of Serbs into Bosnian and Serbian, and the NDH (Independent State of Croatia), which encompassed all of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This Western geopolitical vision has survived every historical upheaval, but it has never succeeded, even in the short term. On the contrary, Republika Srpska represents a step backward for them.
As negotiations between Putin and Trump over Ukraine progress, the discussion will inevitably expand to neighboring countries, the region—and, inevitably, Bosnia will find itself on the agenda. Many will see it as part of their sphere of interest, which could promise it neutrality. However, even this “new Yalta” will have to begin with the original Dayton Agreement—and it will also end there, because it is the only agreement that holds both internal legitimacy (signatures of the parties involved) and international legitimacy (guarantees from major powers). Thus, Bosnia and Herzegovina will return to 1995, and the three-decade interlude will be remembered as “the years devoured by locusts.”
Source: Eagle Eye Explore
